The Institutional Design of Canadian Competition Law: The Evolving Role of the Commissioner by Goldman, Calvin S. & Joneja, Navin
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 41
Issue 3 Spring 2010 Article 9
2010
The Institutional Design of Canadian Competition
Law: The Evolving Role of the Commissioner
Calvin S. Goldman
Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP
Navin Joneja
Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Calvin S. Goldman, & Navin Joneja, The Institutional Design of Canadian Competition Law: The Evolving Role of the Commissioner, 41
Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 535 (2010).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol41/iss3/9
The Institutional Design of Canadian Competition
Law: The Evolving Role of the Commissioner
Calvin S. Goldman, Q. C. *
Navin Joneja **
I. INTRODUCTION
Canada's competition law consists of a bifurcated model with
separate statutory bodies for enforcement and adjudication. One
agency-the Competition Bureau, which is headed by the
Commissioner of Competition-investigates potential anti-competitive
activity, and a separate decision-making body-the Competition
Tribunal-performs the adjudicative function. 1  Over the past several
years, however, the functions carried out by the Commissioner,
supported by the Competition Bureau, have been expanding in terms of
their significance to businesses. Meanwhile, the role of the Competition
Tribunal, partly as a result of legislative amendments, has been
diminished in relative terms. As the roles of the Canadian competition
law institutions continue to evolve, it will be important for policymakers
and stakeholders to continue to assess whether the Canadian framework
achieves the right balance: enabling mergers and other business conduct
to be reviewed and resolved in an efficient, effective, and time-sensitive
manner, while ensuring that such review and case resolution maintain
important principles of procedural fairness.
* Partner and Chair of the Competition, Antitrust & Foreign Investment Group at Blake,
Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto, Canada. From May 1986 until October 1989, Mr. Goldman
was the Director of the Competition Bureau (a position now called "Commissioner"), Ottawa,
Canada.
** Partner, Competition, Antitrust & Foreign Investment Group at Blake, Cassels & Graydon
LLP, Toronto, Canada. Mr. Joneja is called to the Bar in both Canada and the United States and
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would like to thank Jack Quinn, Cathy Beagan Flood, Chad Leddy and Brendan Donovan of
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1. As explained later in this paper, the Competition Tribunal was created for adjudication of
matters pertaining to mergers and civilly reviewable practices. Superior courts of criminal
jurisdiction continue to carry out the adjudicative function for cases that concern the criminal
provisions of the Competition Act.
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This paper explores these issues by first describing, in Part II, the
institutional framework used for Canadian competition law. Part III of
this paper explains how the roles of the Competition Bureau and the
Commissioner have evolved over the past several years due to factors
such as the desire for businesses to negotiate rather than litigate,
especially in merger cases, and a number of recent important legislative
changes. This paper concludes by offering some suggestions for finding
the right balance between an effective competition law enforcement
regime and due process principles.
II. THE CANADIAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION LAW
This Part will briefly address the history of competition law in
Canada, and then explain the structure and function of the current
framework.
A. Historical Development of Competition Law in Canada
Competition law enforcement has a long history in Canada dating
back to 1889, when a predominantly criminal law approach was applied
primarily for federal constitutional reasons. The criminal law approach,
set out for instance in the 1910 Combines Investigation Act, was not
very effective in some areas such as merger review.2 Prior to reforms in
1976 and 1986, those accused of violating Canadian competition law
were entitled to the criminal law standard's presumption of innocence,
and the Crown (the prosecutor in Canadian criminal procedure) had to
prove contravention of the law, including mens rea, beyond a
reasonable doubt. With this heavy burden of proof on the Crown,
relatively few cases proceeded to court, except for cartel and price
maintenance cases, and many competition law prosecutions failed. By
way of example, proving that a merger, with requisite mens rea,
contravened the criminal provision was an excessive burden. The result
was a paucity of jurisprudence for the nineteenth and most of the
twentieth century, except for a number of cartel and resale price
maintenance cases.3
This led to calls for substantial reforms to the system, which were
initially made with legislative amendments in 1976 that created a new
civilly reviewable class of offenses and a quasi-judicial tribunal called
the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. Building on the 1976
amendments, Canada's Competition Act in its present form was largely
2. Combines Investigation Act, 1910 S.C., ch. 9 (Can.).
3. BRIAN A. FACEY & DANY H. ASSAF, COMPETITION & ANTITRUST LAW: CANADA & THE
UNITED STATES 3-4 (3d ed. 2006).
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created in 1986. The 1986 amendments in particular made a major
break from the earlier competition legislation that was based almost
entirely on criminal law enforcement. While it retained the existing
criminal offenses relating to agreements between competitors, price
maintenance, and consumer advertising fraud, the 1986 Competition
Act substantially overhauled the merger and abuse of dominance
provisions, designating them civilly reviewable matters and establishing
the Competition Tribunal to adjudicate such matters. It was after
significant debate both in Parliament as well as among academics,
industry representatives, and the bar that the new competition
legislation and its attendant institutions were created and the existing
approach to contemporary competition law and policy chosen.4 Related
to that development, as a result of a successful challenge in the early
1980s to the then existing legislation's lack of sufficient separation
between the investigative and adjudicative functions, there was a real
concern among policymakers that the investigative and adjudicative
functions should be carried out by separate bodies to avoid potential
fairness issues.5 The Supreme Court of Canada explained this concern
in Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., a unanimous decision:
[I]nvesting the Commission or its members with significant
investigatory functions has the result of vitiating the ability of a
member of the Commission to act in a judicial capacity ... This is not,
of course, a matter of impugning the honesty or good faith of the
Commission or its members. It is rather a conclusion that the
administrative nature of the Commission's investigatory duties (with
its quite proper reference points in considerations of public policy and
effective enforcement of the Act) ill-accords with the neutrality and
detachment necessary to assess whether the evidence reveals that the
point has been reached where the interests of the individual must
constitutionally give way to those of the state.6
Under the new system, the Commissioner (at the time, the statutory
office was called the Director of Investigation and Research) supported
by the Competition Bureau (the "Bureau") retained authority and
responsibility for the investigative aspects of matters that fell under the
4. Although there were challenges to whether the federal Parliament could go beyond its
criminal law power, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in City National Leasing approved of
this new approach by concluding that the federal Parliament also could enact civil competition
laws under its constitutional power to regulate trade and commerce. See Gen. Motors of Can. v.
CityNatl'l Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (Can.).
5. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Designing Competition Law
Institutions, 25 WORLD COMPETITION 361, 391-92 (2002).
6. Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 164 (Can.).
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Act. Those administrative powers were set out in Hunter et al. v.
Southam Inc.:
Under the scheme envisaged by s.10 of the Combines Investigation
Act it is clear that the Director exercises administrative powers
analogous to those of the Minister under s.231(4) of the Income Tax
Act. They too are investigatory rather than adjudicatory, with his
decision to seek approval for an authorization to enter and search
premises equally guided by considerations of expediency and public
policy. 7
A specialized administrative tribunal in the form of the Competition
Tribunal (the "Tribunal") (with judicial and non-judicial members as
discussed below) was created with the intention of providing an
efficient and reliable mode of decision-making for civilly reviewable
matters. Courts continued as the adjudicative bodies for criminal cases.
Accordingly, today, the Canadian institutional framework for
competition law operates under a bifurcated model, in which separate
statutory entities oversee the investigative and adjudicative functions, as
opposed to an integrated agency model in which a single agency would
oversee investigation and adjudication. 8
B. Overview of the Current Canadian Institutional Framework
The institutional framework and relevant law are embodied in the
federal Competition Act9 (the "Act") and the federal Competition
Tribunal Act1 ° (CTA), both of which were introduced in 1986. As
described in more detail below, the Act contains both criminal and non-
criminal (also known as "civil") provisions. The Act also creates the
statutory office of the Commissioner of Competition ("the
Commissioner").' l The Commissioner, who is appointed by the
Governor in Council (which is effectively the Prime Minister and
Cabinet), heads the Bureau 12 and has statutory responsibility for the
7. Id. at 163.
8. Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 5, at 362.
9. The Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985).
10. The Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C., ch. 19 (1985).
11. The Competition Act § 7.
12. The Canadian Competition Bureau website is located at http://www.cb-
bc.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/home. The Bureau's news releases usually state, (as in the one
dated July 21, 2009, in relation to the consent agreement reached with Suncor Energy Inc. and
Petro-Canada): "The Competition Bureau is an independent enforcement agency that contributes
to the prosperity of Canadians by protecting and promoting competitive markets and enabling
informed consumer choice." See e.g., Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau
Acts to Preserve Competition in Suncor / Petro-Canada Merger (July 21, 2009), http://www.cb-
bc.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03103.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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investigation of conduct that may be contrary to the provisions of the
Act.13  Where, after investigation and assessment, the Commissioner
concludes there is a likely contravention of the Act (which is not
resolved), she brings the matter to either: (1) the Tribunal, a specialized
administrative tribunal created for adjudication of civil matters; or (2)
the provincial superior courts of criminal jurisdiction for criminal
matters. Before a criminal matter comes before a provincial superior
court, the Commissioner refers it to the Attorney General for
prosecution. 14
1. The Commissioner of Competition
Under Section 7 of the Act, the Commissioner is responsible for the
administration and enforcement of the Act. The Commissioner derives
her investigative powers from the general and administrative provisions
(Part II) of the Act. Section 10(1) permits the Commissioner to "cause
an inquiry to be made into all such matters as the Commissioner
considers necessary to inquire into with the view of determining the
facts." 15 Inquiries usually follow preliminary examinations of a matter.
Most inquiries commence when the Commissioner has reason to believe
that a violation of the Act has occurred; inquiries must be conducted in
private. This authority is accompanied by investigatory powers under
section 11(1) to obtain information on ex parte applications. If an
inquiry has been initiated under section 10 and a person or affiliate "is
likely to have information that is relevant to the inquiry," a court may
order attendance or document production upon ex parte application by
the Commissioner. Such orders have effect anywhere in Canada. 16
Prior to 1952, Canada left competition law decisions to a Minister
selected by the Prime Minister, usually from within his own political
party. 17 This model entailed a high level of political accountability, but
little independent decision-making. Today, the Commissioner is
13. The Commissioner is also charged with enforcing the Consumer Packaging and Labelling
Act, R.S.C., ch. C-38 (1985), the Precious Metals Marketing Act, R.S.C., ch. P-19 (1985), and the
Textile Labelling Act, R.S.C., ch. T-10 (1985).
14. As discussed below, all prosecutions are brought by the Attorney General representing the
Crown, prior to which there is a referral by the Commissioner. Another relatively unique feature
of Canadian competition law is the fact that the Commissioner plays a role outside of the four
comers of competition law enforcement. Under sections 125 and 126 of the Act, the
Commissioner may, on his or her own initiative or on direction from the Minister, make
representations and call evidence before federal or provincial boards, commissions or tribunals.
The Competition Act §§ 125-26.
15. Id. § 10(l).
16. Id. § 11(4).
17. See Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 5, at 364.
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appointed by the Governor in Council, 18 which is a cabinet level
appointment, and is given a significant degree of independence to
exercise her enforcement mandate. The independence of enforcement
officials is essential for ensuring that the balancing of competing
interests and objectives will occur in an unbiased and objective manner,
guided by established legal rules and enforcement policies. 19
The Commissioner is, to a very limited degree, overseen by the
Minister of Industry (the "Minister"). The Minister does not oversee
competition investigations, and has only limited powers to review or
discontinue inquiries,20 or to instruct the Commissioner to make further
inquiries, 2 1 but the Commissioner is ultimately responsible for the
administration and enforcement of the Act. This degree of
independence from government is important in that it depoliticizes
enforcement decisions, reduces the risk of perceived bias, and provides
consistency from one political term to the next. In this connection, as
noted above, the Commissioner has the statutory authority to commence
inquiries "into all such matters as the Commissioner considers
necessary." 22 It also is the Commissioner who decides which sections
of the Act should be the subject of the inquiry, the overall scope of the
inquiry, what enforcement proceedings should occur as a result of the
inquiry, and to an increasing extent, the terms of resolution, if any, that
may be required at the conclusion of the inquiry.
Related to the independence of the Commissioner is the need for
adequate funding for the Commissioner and the Bureau. 23 The amount
18. The Competition Act § 7(1).
19. For a more detailed discussion of process issues, see Calvin S. Goldman & Joel T.
Kissack, Cross-Border Issues In Competition Policy: Lessons from the Canadian Experience,
Conference on Trade And Competition Policy, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Montreal,
Canada (May 13, 1997) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
20. The Competition Act § 22(l).
21. Id. § 22(4).
22. Id. § 10(c). See also Ravenshoe Services Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition),
[2001] 15 C.P.R. (4th) 543 (F.C.) (Can.) (the Commissioner has the authority to commence and
to expand inquiries; the investigatory power of section 11 does not contravene the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms protection against unreasonable searches and seizures);
Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Canada (Dir. of Investigation & Research), [1997] 74 C.P.R. (3d) 65
(Can.) (an inquiry under the Competition Act does not end until the Director is satisfied that he
has determined the relevant facts, sufficient for him to refer the matter to the Attorney General
and the Attorney General brings charges against those individuals or corporations); Charette v.
Canada (Comm'r of Competition), [2002] 20 C.P.R. (4th) 61 (F.C.) (Can.); Ashley v. Canada
(Comm'r of Competition), [2006] 47 C.P.R. (4th) 379 (F.C.) (Can.) (the Commissioner cannot be
forced by private parties to commence or to continue an inquiry).
23. Nearly 30 years ago, the Economic Council of Canada remarked that "[as] a form of social
control of industry, well-working competitive markets supported by competition policy are
[Vol. 41
2010] The Institutional Design of Canadian Competition Law 541
of resources devoted to competition enforcement has to be constantly
re-evaluated to account for changes in markets, government action such
as deregulation, which may increase the Commissioner's mandate, and
other factors. Increasing demands on the Bureau's resources have led to
some comments that increasing the Bureau's resources and ensuring the
Commissioner has control of those resources is necessary to ensure the
Bureau can continue to effectively fulfill its mandate in a timely
manner.24  This may be particularly so in light of the recent
amendments to the Competition Act passed in March of 2009,25 which
established a supplementary information request process for mergers,
similar to the Hart-Scott-Rodino filing requirement and second request
process in the United States. The 2009 amendments will inevitably
require more resources for the Mergers Branch of the Bureau to allow it
to complete such reviews in a properly informed manner without
unnecessarily delaying proposed mergers. Moreover, as the
Commissioner's role is evolving toward one that necessitates in our
view additional steps to ensure process fairness, particularly in the
resolution of merger cases, additional funding for such steps may also
be required; for example, increasing the staff and advisers, including
counsel, available to the Commissioner may be needed to assist the
Commissioner's responsibilities in this context, as discussed below.
2. The Competition Tribunal
In Canada, cases involving enforcement of the civil provisions of the
Act, such as mergers, refusals to deal, abuses of dominance, and other
anticompetitive acts (termed "civilly reviewable practices") are heard by
the Tribunal upon application by the Commissioner. The Tribunal was
created and designed to combine business, economic, and legal
remarkably cheap by comparison with alternatives such as direct regulation." ECONOMIC
COUNCIL OF CANADA, INTERIM REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 193 (1969).
24. For example, in the 1996 Report of the Consultative Panel formed by the Department of
Industry Canada to consider proposed amendments to the Act, the Panel remarked that "cost
recovery measures should be explored as an alternative means of addressing resource constraints,
particularly if it could be assured that the Bureau would directly benefit from the imposition of
any such fees that might be introduced." DEPT. OF INDUSTRY CANADA, REPORT OF THE
CONSULTATIVE PANEL ON AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPETITION ACT 33 (1996). The
Commissioner's mandate has increased since 1996 as a result of continued deregulation, the
addition of other statutes to the Commissioner's mandate, and broader merger powers as
discussed below. See also Calvin S. Goldman, Robert E. Kwinter & Crystal L. Witterick,
Enhancing the Efficiency, Effectiveness and Accountability of the Competition Bureau: A
Proposal for Change, Remarks at the Competition Law Roundtable of The Law and Economics
Programme at the University of Toronto 7-9 (Dec. 13, 2002).
25. See The Competition Act §§ 114, 123.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
expertise.26 The Supreme Court of Canada remarked in Canada
(Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.:
The aims of the Act are more "'economic' than they are strictly
"'legal.' The "'efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian
economy"' and the relationships among Canadian companies and their
foreign competitors are matters that business women and men and
economists. are better able to understand than is a typical judge.
Perhaps recognizing this, Parliament created a specialized
Competition Tribunal and invested it with responsibility for the
administration of the civil part of the Competition Act.27
Accordingly, the Tribunal is comprised of no more than six judicial
members selected from the Federal Court as well as no more than eight
experts appointed by the Governor in Council.28
Questions of fact, or of mixed law and fact, are determined by all of
the members sitting in the proceedings, while pure questions of law are
determined only by the judicial members.29 The Tribunal has all such
powers as are vested in a superior court of record, including with
respect to the examination of witnesses and the enforcement of its
orders,30 to make rules, 31 to award costs, 32 and to order a variety of
prohibitions or remedial orders.33 In fact, the remedial powers of the
Tribunal are quite broad, and may include, in the case of
anticompetitive practices, the power to order such actions "as are
reasonable and as are necessary to overcome the effects of the
practice." 34  The Tribunal may also dissolve mergers or order
divestitures 35 and, in the case of abuse of dominance cases, as a result of
the 2009 amendments, impose administrative monetary penalties of up
to C$10 million on corporations.36 Breach of a Tribunal order may be
punished by contempt proceedings before a judicial member 37 or by
prosecution either by summary conviction or by indictment.38 Appeals
26. FACEY & ASSAF, supra note 3, at 31.
27. Canada (Dir. of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, 48
(Can.).
28. The Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C., ch. 19, § 3(2) (1985).
29. Id. § 12.
30. Id. § 8(2).
31. Id. § 16.
32. Id. §8.1.
33. Id. §9(5).
34. The Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. 19, § 79(2) (1985).
35. Id. § 92.
36. Id. §§ 74.1, 79.
37. The Competition Tribunal Act § 8(3).
38. The Competition Act § 66.
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from the decisions of the Tribunal go directly to the Federal Court of
Appeal and from there to the Supreme Court of Canada. 39
From a substantive perspective, the civil provisions of the Act, which
the Tribunal enforces and are contained in Part VIII, can be divided into
mergers and other (non-merger) civilly reviewable practices. With
respect to mergers, if a proposed (or a completed) transaction is likely to
give rise to a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in a
market in Canada, then the Commissioner may apply for a remedial
order (such as an injunction or an order to divest specified assets or
shares) to the Tribunal pursuant to the merger provisions of the Act.40
Additional provisions in the Act deal with certain civilly reviewable
practices that are not objectionable per se, and are therefore not
prohibited. However, if certain conditions are fulfilled-notably, where
the conduct has a substantially negative effect on competition-the
Commissioner may refer the matter to the Tribunal for review. If the
Tribunal finds that the statutory conditions are met, it may issue an
order prohibiting the continuance of the offending conduct and, in some
cases, make additional orders to overcome the anticompetitive effects of
the conduct. These include: abuse of dominance, price maintenance,
exclusive dealing, tied selling, and other practices included in the civil
provisions of the Act. A more detailed description of the key civil
provisions is provided in Appendix A.
3. Enforcement of Criminal Provisions
Criminal matters under the Act, such as conspiracy, bid-rigging, and
certain false or misleading representations, are referred by the Bureau to
the federal Attorney General for prosecution through provincial superior
courts of criminal jurisdiction.4 1 In criminal matters, the decision to lay
charges will be ultimately up to the Attorney General.42 In practice,
39. The Competition Tribunal Act §13. But an appeal on a question of fact alone requires
leave of the Federal Court of Appeal. See id. § 13(2) (1985).
40. If a proposed transaction meets certain tests relating to (i) the combined size of the parties
and their respective affiliates, and (ii) the size of the business being acquired, then the pre-merger
notification provisions of Part IX of The Competition Act require that completion of the
transaction be delayed until certain information concerning the parties and their affiliates has been
filed and a prescribed waiting period has expired.
41. Criminal prosecution by the Attorney General may proceed simultaneously with
continuing investigations by the Bureau. See Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Canada (Dir. of
Investigation & Research) [ 1997] 74 C.P.R. (3d) 65, 7 (Can.).
42. The Commissioner may recommend to the Attorney General that individuals or firms be
granted immunity as a result of their cooperation in the detection and investigation of criminal
offenses, but only the Attorney General is able to grant immunity from prosecution.
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however, the two agencies work closely together and the Attorney
General will often follow recommendations by the Commissioner.43
As noted above, significant amendments to the conspiracy provisions
of the Act were recently enacted in 2009 by Canada's Parliament. The
provisions of the Act dealing with horizontal agreements were amended
to create a "dual-track" approach to the treatment of agreements and
arrangements between competitors. While most other amendments to
the Act came into force on March 12, 2009, the amendments to the
provisions dealing with agreements between competitors came into
effect on March 12, 2010.
The consequences of violating the criminal provisions of the Act can
be severe. The Act makes certain types of criminal offenses punishable
by fines in the discretion of the court and/or imprisonment for periods
of up to fourteen years. In this regard, it is important to note that once
the amendments to the conspiracy provisions of the Act come into force
in 2010, potential fines for criminal conspiracies will increase from $10
million to $25 million and the maximum term of imprisonment will
increase from five to fourteen years.44
4. Limited Scope for Private Actions
The extent to which private parties participate in competition law
enforcement in Canada has been the subject of much debate. On the
one hand, private actions may contribute to competition law
enforcement, free up government resources, and produce a body of
jurisprudence and reasoned judgments necessary to explain for
businesses how the rules might apply to specific and concrete facts of
each case. On the other hand, increased scope for private actions raises
the prospect of frivolous "nuisance suits," a potential chilling effect on
business development, and overly complex economic issues being heard
by unspecialized courts.45
Historically, private parties have not played a significant role in
Canadian competition law enforcement. In the United States, private
actions before general civil courts for violations of antitrust laws
account for the majority of all formal enforcement actions. The United
States' approach has been fostered by a combination of treble damages,
contingency fees, one-way cost rules, and liberal class-action
43. See FACEY & ASSAF, supra note 3, at 30.
44. The Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, §§ 45(1), 45(2) (1985) (effective Mar. 12, 2010).
45. Jack Quinn, Navin Joneja & Prakash Narayanan, Public Good Through Private Action -
Enhancing Compliance Through Private Enforcement 7, Remarks at the 2006 Competition Law
and Policy Forum at the Northwinds Professional Institute (Apr. 24-26, 2006).
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procedures. 46 In Canada, by comparison, private actions were relatively
rare until recent years. Canada has, however, been opening the door to
increased private participation in competition law enforcement,
particularly in relation to class actions alleging damages for cartel cases.
Section 36 of the Act provides for the ability to recover damages to
compensate for harm suffered as a result of conduct that contravenes a
criminal provision of the Act contained in Part VI, such as price-fixing
and bid rigging (or conduct that is contrary to an order of the Tribunal).
While a criminal conviction is not necessary to pursue a claim under
section 36, such a conviction would constitute prima facie evidence in a
civil suit.4 7 With respect to the civil provisions, there are no private
rights of action for damages for conduct contrary to the mergers, abuses
of dominance, or other civilly reviewable trade practices provisions.
However, 2002 amendments to the Act created limited rights of private
access to the Tribunal for certain provisions. 48 In this regard, section
103.1 of the Act permits any person to apply to the Tribunal for leave to
make applications for remedial orders (not damages) with respect to
refusals to deal, exclusive dealing, tied selling, and market restriction.
The most recent 2009 amendments added price maintenance to this
list.49 In addition to these statutory rights, private parties may also have
recourse to common law actions, such as the torts of conspiracy,
inducing breach of contract, or unlawful interference with economic
relations. 50
Accordingly, unlike in some other jurisdictions, especially the United
States, in Canada the Commissioner obtains little assistance from
private antitrust litigants with respect to antitrust law enforcement.
Except for the limited rights of private action, under sections 36 and
103.1 of the Act, it remains the sole prerogative of the Commissioner to
investigate violations of the provisions of the Competition Act and to
determine whether a case should be brought. It should be noted that
also unlike the United States, there are no provincial or state antitrust
authorities that actively pursue cases in conjunction with their federal
counterpart.
46. See Kent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition Laws, 34
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 461 (1996).
47. FACEY & ASSAF, supra note 3, at 481.
48. Bill C-23, An Act to Amend the Competition Act and the Competition Tribunal Act, 1st
Sess., 37th Parl., 2001, which came into force in June 2002.
49. See The Competition Act § 103.1(7.1).
50. FACEY & ASSAF, supra note 3, at 484-85.
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSIONER
Even though Canada uses a bifurcated model, it is clear that the role
of the Commissioner is critically important to the institutional design,
given her central role and increasing mandate over enforcement and
case resolution. In addition, there are a number of other features of the
Canadian fabric that have progressively enhanced the importance of the
Commissioner's role since the current institutional framework was
largely established in 1986. Among other things, these include: the
desire of many parties to reach negotiated resolutions to business
conduct cases, particularly in the merger context; legislative changes to
the consent order process; more recent amendments to the merger
review process and criminal conspiracy provisions; and the proliferation
of agency enforcement guidelines, which are widely viewed as
expressions of the Bureau's enforcement approach. This Part examines
these factors and their impact on the institutional framework in Canada,
pointing out that the Commissioner's role is in some respects evolving
to include a de facto decision-making function rather than solely an
investigative one.51
A. Desire to Pursue Negotiated Resolutions
Businesses in Canada (and elsewhere) place a significant emphasis
on a reasonable level of predictability and certainty in order to arrange
their affairs. This is true particularly in the merger context: protracted
delays coupled with the use of the litigation process (which may include
a public adversarial setting) are not generally favored by parties
planning a proposed transaction. 52 Businesses usually make every
reasonable effort to predict with relative specificity: whether or not a
particular transaction may raise significant substantive competition law
concerns; what type of information needs to be furnished to address
concerns that may be raised; and ultimately if approval will be granted,
approximately when, and under what remedial terms, if any, it will be
granted. This type of relative certainty is critical to business planning,
especially in the merger context. Mergers are different than other
business conduct as they often involve "sea changes" to corporations or
at least major changes to corporations' businesses as well as the
positions of many executives. Mergers are also usually time' sensitive:
the longer they are "in limbo" and the parties are unable to fully
51. Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 5, at 374.
52. See Calvin S. Goldman, The Merger Resolution Process Under the Competition Act: A
Critical Time In Its Development, 22 OrrAWA L. REv. 1, 11 (1990).
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integrate and forward plan, the greater the anxiety of many executives,
coupled with loss of potential synergistic integrated business revenues.
Conversely, unnecessary delays and lack of predictability of the
enforcement process can add to uncertainty, which may have a chilling
effect on potentially pro-competitive business activity. The possible
consequences of excessive uncertainty in enforcement policy may
include: the inhibition or prevention of innovation and the achievement
of potential efficiency gains; limitations on growth and the creation of
new businesses; inhibiting and distorting international investment; and
the reluctance of business persons to ultimately work with government
in the creation of new structures used to carry on business. These
factors are not unique to mergers within, or that affect, Canada.
Despite the fact that the Canadian merger review process is of
relatively recent design (i.e., less than twenty-five years old), we believe
that the increasing dynamism of markets generally have created
unanticipated pressures on the timeliness of enforcement decisions. We
do not think that the impact of this change in Canadian markets is
limited to merger review; it has implications for enforcement decisions
that the Commissioner must make under the Act generally. In
postulating that Canadian markets have become more dynamic, we refer
to an increase in the rate of change in market and competitive
conditions. The speeding-up in the evolution of competitive conditions
increases pressures for management because it amplifies the risk of
misreading or otherwise missing out on new market developments,
risks, and opportunities. If this tendency for markets to evolve more
rapidly continues, it will create increased pressure for change in the
design of the functions of competition authorities, including the
Commissioner and the Bureau.
Therefore, in the merger context, parties usually prefer to have
discussions and dialogue with the Bureau to determine at an early stage
whether potential competition concerns can be resolved. If the Bureau's
concerns are not readily addressed by additional information,
submissions, or by altering or "fixing" the scope of the proposed
merger, then the parties will usually at least attempt to negotiate a
mutually acceptable remedy with the Commissioner, rather than
proceed to litigation, which can be relatively uncertain, time-
consuming, costly, and public. Time and uncertainty factors are real
considerations for many businesses deciding whether to litigate or
resolve a merger in accordance with terms acceptable to the
Commissioner. The fact that parties have little desire to litigate cases,
particularly in the mergers area, due to the business uncertainty that
litigation inherently entails, clearly gives the Commissioner significant
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bargaining leverage in negotiation discussions. As discussed below,
this additional authority should be exercised in a procedurally fair
manner.
We are not suggesting that there will no longer be contested merger
cases in Canada. There is always a litigation contingency, particularly
in certain types of merger cases. For example, there may be
circumstances where parties can close the transaction, sometimes on a
hold separate basis, and then take the time to engage in contested
proceedings. That likelihood increases when parties are able to isolate
one or two issues to be determined. However, in our view, the
incidence of contested merger cases will still be exceptional for all the
reasons summarized above.
The unwillingness of parties to take their disputes to the Tribunal is
reflected in the numbers. Reportedly, about 99% of all mergers notified
to the Bureau have been resolved through negotiation with the Bureau
without the involvement of the Tribunal.53 In 2008, the Tribunal held
fourteen proceedings, seven of which concerned either the registration
or variance of a consent agreement and therefore were not contested
proceedings. Five others dealt with leave applications under the refusal
to deal or exclusive dealing provisions (only one of which was granted)
and two dealt with deceptive marketing practices cases. Similarly, in
2007, the Tribunal held ten proceedings, five of which concerned either
the registration or variance of a consent agreement. Three others
concerned leave applications under the refusal to deal or exclusive
dealing provisions. 54 There has been only one contested merger case
before the Tribunal over this recent time period (the Labatt-Lakeport
merger), even though the Bureau examined approximately 300 mergers
in 2007-2008 and approximately 340 mergers in 2006-2007. 55 Indeed,
since 1986, there have been only a handful of fully contested merger
cases heard by the Tribunal.
53. Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 5, at 374.
54. Information on all cases brought before the Tribunal can be found at the Canadian
Competition Tribunal website, http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CasesAffaires/CasesDateDecided-eng.asp
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
55. See COMPETITION BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF COMPETITION
FOR THE YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 2008, at 65 (2008), available at http://www
.competitlonbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Annua-2008-web-e.pdf/$FILE/Annual-2008-
web-e.pdf; COMPETITION BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF COMPETITION
FOR THE YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 2007, at 37 (2007), available at
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/annual-report-2006-2007-
e.pdf/$FILE/annual-report-2006-2007-e.pdf.
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B. Legislative Changes to the Process for Negotiating Consent Orders
Prior to 2002, in reviewing a proposed negotiated remedy in the form
of a proposed consent order between the Commissioner and the parties
whose conduct was at issue, the Tribunal would undertake a substantial
approval process wherein it would examine the evidence and decide
whether or not the proposed consent order, as agreed to by the
Commissioner and the parties, would eliminate concerns regarding the
anticompetitive effect of the practice at issue. The consent order
process was described in Director of Investigation and Research v. Air
Canada56 as follows:
It is clear that the Tribunal's constituent legislation does not
contemplate that the Tribunal will be a mere rubber stamp. The
legislation, for example, does not provide for the automatic filing, by
the Director, of settlements which he reaches with respondents so that
they automatically become orders of the Tribunal.. .. The Tribunal is
composed of judicial members and of non-judicial members who have
special expertise in areas relevant to the work of the Tribunal. It is
required to sit in panels of three, even for the purpose of granting
consent orders. It is clear that Parliament intended the Tribunal to
exercise an independent judgment with respect to such orders .... At
the same time, the legislation sends a very clear message to the
Tribunal that it is not anticipated that the Tribunal should take a
detailed role in the crafting of consent orders.57
The Tribunal also took into account views of third party interveners
in connection with its review of a proposed consent order; some of
those interventions were in writing, others were both in writing and in
oral argument made by counsel before the Tribunal.
In Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Imperial Oil
Ltd.,58 the Tribunal made it clear that "[P]roposals which the Director
puts forward are treated with initial deference. There is an initial
assumption that they will accomplish what the Director asserts they are
designed to do." 59 Under this process, the Tribunal, as an independent
adjudicative body, ultimately played a relatively active role; in practice,
the Tribunal's reviews may have gone too far. For example, the
Tribunal declined to grant the proposed consent order in the very first
proceeding brought before it, the Palm Dairies case, which involved the
proposed purchase by four major western dairy co-operatives of their
56. Dir. of Investigation and Research v. Air Canada, [1989] 27 C.P.R. (3d) 476, 482 (Can.).
57. Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
58. [1990] 31 C.P.R. (3d) 277 (Comp. Trib.).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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major competitor. 60  The Tribunal expressed concerns about the
perpetual and mandatory nature of the proposed arrangement and the
effectiveness of some of the terms contained in the proposed order. In
that case, the Tribunal stated:
Under the Act the Director has wide discretion to determine what
acquisitions or mergers should be challenged. He has authority under
section 74 to approve acquisitions and mergers without involvement
of the Tribunal. But once the Director has invoked the adjudicative
powers of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has a duty to determine the nature
of the anti-competitive conduct and to fashion an order which in its
judgment serves the purposes of the Act. Or, at the very least when
the Tribunal is asked to issue a consent order it is incumbent on it to
satisfy itself that that order will be effective to accomplish, with due
regard to the circumstances of the case, the objectives of the Act.61
The Tribunal also noted that counsel for the Director argued that:
[I]t is essential in order to accomplish the purposes of the Competition
Act that the Tribunal be amenable to issuing consent orders negotiated
by the Director and the respondents. This last point, it is argued, is
based on the fact that Parliament's intention was clearly to encourage
the negotiation of consent orders.... Consent orders save the parties
the attendant costs ofprotracted litigation; they are more acceptable
to respondents who do not, from a business point of view, find it easy
to tolerate the lengthy delays which can be imposed upon them by the
Director in pursuing cases before the Tribunal (and through the
appeal courts); consent orders save the Tribunal, itself, time and
cost.
6 2
From the end of 1986 until the early part of 1989, no further
applications for consent orders were made to the Tribunal; the
consistent reaction of counsel at the time was one of reluctance to
pursue consent order discussions because of the uncertainty generated in
large part by the Palm Dairies decision.63 And notwithstanding the
Tribunal's statement about "initial deference" in Canada (Director of
Investigation & Research) v. Imperial Oil Ltd., the consent order
hearing involved many weeks of near adversarial proceedings and
required the parties to substantially revise the proposed order before the
Tribunal approved it in 1990. Accordingly, while the pre-2002 consent
order process did hold true to the bifurcated model approach, it also
60. Dir. of Investigation & Research v. Palm Dairies Ltd., [1986] 12 C.P.R. (3d) 540 (Can.).
61. Id. 11 (emphasis added).
62. Id. 16 (emphasis added).
63. Goldman, supra note 52, at 9, 20, 27. This occurred even though the Tribunal attempted
in the Air Canada case, supra note 56, to narrow the broad review mandate it had established for
itself in the Palm Dairies case in relation to consent orders.
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signified problematic effects in the form of perceived risk of possible
costly evidentiary and adversarial requirements of litigation. Parties
that sought to resolve their issues through negotiated remedies lost a
measure of predictability and relative expediency, which is considered
essential particularly in the merger context.64 While there indeed were
a number of consent orders which were approved by the Tribunal from
1989-2000, in Commissioner of Competition v. Ultramar Ltd., the
Tribunal again refused to endorse a draft consent order that had been
negotiated between the Commissioner and the parties; it concluded that
it was not satisfied that certain terms of the draft order dealing with
prices and terms of sale in the context of behavioral remedies were
"sufficiently clear to be enforceable and justifiable in order to provide
an effective remedy that meets the objectives of the Act."65  In
particular, the Tribunal felt that the establishment of a maximum price
and an obligation to negotiate in good faith in the draft order, without
any reference to price formulae, fair market value, or other justifiable
guideline for determining price, were insufficient.66 This led the
Commissioner at the time to recommend changes to the consent order
process:
In February 2000, in response to the announced purchase of Coastal
Canada Petroleum Inc. by Ultramar Ltd., we filed an application for a
Consent Order with the Competition Tribunal. Our examination of the
proposed acquisition concluded that removal of Coastal as the largest
supplier of petroleum products to independent marketers in the Ottawa
market would likely substantially lessen or prevent competition. To
address these concerns, Ultramar agreed to a draft consent order
containing several measures to ensure continued access to a
competitive source of supply to the independent marketers. In
addition, Ultramar agreed to refurbish and reactivate its Ottawa
terminal and offer for sale the Coastal terminal in Ottawa at fair
market value if it failed to abide by the terms of the Consent Order.
On April 26, 2000, the Tribunal issued its decision refusing to grant
the order as it was not convinced that the terms were effective or
sufficiently clear to be enforceable. Following the Tribunal decision,
Ultramar and Coastal decided to abandon the proposed transaction.
64. The advantage of negotiated resolutions has long been emphasized. See generally
Goldman, supra note 52 (analyzing the consent order resolution procedure pertaining to merger
review under the 1986 Competition Act). Moreover, if parties to a public resolution in the form
of a proposed consent order anticipate a likely full review before an adjudicative body with active
third party intervention, they may hold back their willingness to make certain concessions in
order to keep something in reserve for possible additional concession before the Tribunal. This
adds to further time delays and lack of reasonable predictability.
65. Comm'r of Competition v. Ultramar Ltd., [2000] 6 C.P.R. 50, 2000 Comp. Trib. 4 (Can.).
66. Id.
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As a result of the Tribunal's decision, we are considering
recommending the adoption of a process of registration of consent
orders similar to that provided for by section 74.12 in Part VII. 1 of the
Act, the civil track for deceptive marketing practices.
67
Accordingly, the law regarding the consent order process was
significantly changed in 2002 in a manner that diminished the role of
the Tribunal and, as an important corollary, effectively expanded the
role of the Commissioner. 68  Pursuant to that amendment, which is in
67. Konrad von Finckenstein, Comm'r of Competition, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Bar Association, Competition Law Section (Sept. 21, 2000), available at
http://competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/0 1 200.html.
68. In Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Burns Lake Native Development Corp., the
Tribunal stated that:
The DCO Approval Process was time-consuming, unpredictable and expensive. The
Commissioner who filed applications for the approval of DCOs and parties who settled
with the Commissioner would not know how long the process would take, whether
there would be a hearing and, if so, whether any third parties would intervene. They
also had no idea whether the terms of their settlement would be approved or whether
changes to the DCO would be required. The usual benefits of a settlement which
include an end to litigation, certainty about ongoing obligations and reduced costs were
not features of settlements with the Commissioner because of the DCO Approval
Process and, for this reason, the process was much criticized.
A report prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
in 2002 (OECD, The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform - Regulatory
Reform in Canada. Paris, OECD, 2002, p. 16) includes the following statement about
the DCO Approval Process:
The consent order process at the Tribunal has been problematic. All orders,
including those from negotiated settlements, must be issued by the Tribunal,
which is the first-instance decision-maker. The process of reviewing a proposed
consent order takes at least 60 days, for publishing notice and providing an
opportunity for intervention and so on. It can stretch out to 6 months, though.
Moreover, the Tribunal has sometimes demanded changes to the deal that the
Bureau and the parties have reached. The risk of uncertainty and delay has
reportedly encouraged firms to seek more informal resolutions rather than
negotiating consent orders.
[emphasis added]
An article entitled "Rethinking the Role of the Competition Tribunal" stated that,
"[...] time, cost and uncertainty of consent proceedings has [...] given the Director a
powerful incentive to resolve reviewable practice complaints through undertakings."
(Neil Campbell, Hudson Janisch and Michael Trebilcock, "Rethinking the Role of the
Competition Tribunal" (1997) Can. Bar. R. 297 at p. 313)
The Current Consent Agreement Registration Process
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry Science and Technology
(the "Standing Committee") held hearings to consider Bill C-23, which contained
proposed amendments to the Act, and accepted the views of witnesses who supported
the portion of the Bill which introduced registered consent agreements to replace the
DCO Process. One such witness was Mr. Tim Kinnish, then Chairman of the National
Competition Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association. He testified, in part, as
follows:
We agree that the existing consent process has been unsatisfactory virtually from
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current section 105, the Commissioner may now sign a consent
agreement and file it with the Tribunal for immediate registration as an
order based on terms that could be the subject of an order of the
Tribunal. 69 Thus, as long as the terms are ones that could have been
made by the Tribunal, the proposed terms are to be given effect as if
made by the Tribunal. Upon registration, an agreement has the same
force and effect as an order of the Tribunal itself.70 Furthermore, the
revised consent agreement process provides that a person directly
affected by a consent agreement may apply to the Tribunal to have its
terms rescinded or varied, but the Tribunal may only grant such an
application "if it finds that the person has established that the terms
could not be the subject of an order of the Tribunal. '71 This very high
standard significantly limits the role of third parties compared to that
which existed prior to the 2002 amendment. The contrast between pre-
2002 and post-2002 consent order regimes was summarized by the
Tribunal in RONA Inc. v. Commissioner of Competition in the following
manner:
Previously, the Tribunal had to consider the terms and conditions
of the agreement and ensure that, at a minimum, it eliminated the
substantial lessening or prevention of competition (see for example
Commissioner of Competition v. Trilogy Retail Enterprises L.P., 2001
Comp. Trib. 29). Under the new scheme, the consent agreement is
its inception. It is uncertain in its operation, time-consuming and costly. We
support the need for reform in this area and generally support the provisions of
Bill C-23 providing for the registration of consent agreements. [Standing
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Evidence, November 7, 2001]
The subsequent amendments to the Act in 2002 increased the reliability of the
Commissioner's settlements by eliminating the DCO Process and replacing it with a
"Consent Agreement Registration Process" in which the terms of settlements are
incorporated in consent agreements. They are then simply registered with the Tribunal.
This change has had two consequences. First, the Tribunal no longer approves the
Commissioner's settlements before they became final and second, intervenors who are
directly affected no longer have an opportunity to express their concerns before the
settlements are finalized. Instead, subsection 106(2) was enacted to give third parties
an opportunity to persuade the Tribunal to rescind or vary the terms of the settlement
after it had been finalized and registered. However, this right is circumscribed in that:
* it must be exercised within sixty days of the registration of a consent order
* it can only be exercised by "directly affected" third parties.
* it can only succeed if the third party can show that the Tribunal could not
have ordered the remedies that appear in the terms of a consent agreement
Comm'r of Competition v. Burns Lake Native Dev. Corp., [2006] C.C.T.D. 16, 28-32 (Can.).
69. The Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 105(2) (1985).
70. Id. § 105(3)-(4).
71. Id. § 106(2).
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simply filed with the registry of the Tribunal "for immediate
registration" under subsection 105(3) of the Act.72
Even if the evidence adduced before the Tribunal to obtain a
consent order under the former section 105 need not have been as
substantial as the evidence required, for example, in section 92 merger
cases, some evidence had to be filed as provided by the Competition
Tribunal Rules. For a consent order, the parties were required to
submit an impact statement (Rule 77(1)(b)) providing "an explanation
of the draft consent order, including an explanation of the
circumstances giving rise to the draft order or any provision of the
draft order, the relief to be obtained if the order is made and the
anticipated effects on competition of that relief (Rule 77(3)).73
Under the current scheme, the Tribunal sees none of the evidence
supporting the Commissioner's decision to deny a merger without a
consent agreement and is not to engage even in the most cursory
assessment of the proposed remedial measure. The Tribunal must
register the consent agreement immediately, whereupon it "has the
same force and effect ... as if it were an order of the Tribunal" even
though it is not, strictly speaking, such an order.74
Accordingly, as of 2002, the Tribunal's ability to review proposed
consent orders and act as an independent adjudicative body or a
gatekeeper to implementing a decision has been greatly diminished.
Consequently, parties are left to deal with the Commissioner, especially
in relation to resolution of most mergers, and the Tribunal often acts as
little more than a registrar. 75  There is now much more than a mere
"initial assumption" that a draft consent agreement should be made an
order of the Tribunal; rather, there is virtually a blanket assumption
assuming the jurisdictional threshold is met. No proposed consent order
since the 2002 amendment has been set aside by the Tribunal. Thus, in
Canada there is now likely a significantly greater presumption that a
consent agreement will be given adjudicative effect than under U.S.
antitrust law, where the Tunney Act states that "[b]efore entering any
consent judgment proposed by the United States under this section, the
court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public
interest."' 76 The provision has been used, for example, in relation to
72. RONA Inc. v. Comm'r of Competition, [2005] Comp. Trib. 18, 72 (Can.).
73. Id. 73.
74. Id. 1 74 (emphasis added).
75. See The Competition Act § 106 (delegating to the Tribunal the power to rescind or vary a
consent order under the Act).
76. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties (Tunney) Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706
(1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (2000)). The extent to which U.S. courts are to pay
deference to consent judgments has been a matter of intense debate. See, e.g., John J. Flynn &
Darren Bush, The Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act: The Adverse Consequences of the
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proceedings pertaining to Microsoft Corp.77 While the Tunney Act has
not been the source of nearly as much judicial activism as we have seen
in Canada in relation to proposed consent orders in antitrust cases prior
to 2002 (in proportionate terms), it still ensures that United States courts
are not just registries for orders negotiated by the Justice Department,
which is effectively the current law in Canada for orders negotiated by
the Commissioner.
C. THE IMPACT OF THE 2009 STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
As mentioned above, in March 2009, the Canadian Parliament
enacted legislative amendments which constituted a number of
significant changes to Canada's competition law. Compared to other
amendments of similar significance, there was not nearly the same
degree of stakeholder consultations prior to being enacted. A key
aspect of the amendments was to make the Canadian Competition Act
more aligned with U.S. antitrust law in several key areas. While the
impact of the recent amendments is still being analyzed (and the
amendments to the criminal conspiracy provisions come into effect in
March 2010), it appears that the recent amendments will likely further
enhance the role of the Commissioner, supported by the Bureau, in
competition law enforcement.
1. Merger Review Process
The recent amendments align the Canadian merger review process
even more closely with the United States' "second request" process for
merger review: under the amended Canadian statutory provisions, there
is an initial thirty-day waiting period followed by a possible demand for
information through the issuance, at the Commissioner's discretion, of a
more detailed Supplementary Information Request (SIR) in cases where
further information (and time) is required for the Commissioner to
conduct her review.7 8  The parties are not permitted to close the
transaction until 30 days after compliance with the SIR, and the
Commissioner retains the ability to seek an injunction to prevent closing
or extend the review period even at that time. Under the previous law,
"Microsoft Fallacies," 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 749, 750 (2003) (analyzing two Microsoft
Corporation cases in regards to "the standards of judicial review that should apply in a Tunney
Act consent decree proceeding where no litigation has taken place").
77. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2002); United States
v. Microsoft Corp., No. C1V.A.94-1564, 1995 WL 505998, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995); see
also Goldman, supra note 52, at 38-41 (comparing the Tunney Act review standards for consent
decrees with the Competition Act's review standards pre-2002).
78. The Competition Act §§ 114, 123.
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the Bureau had to rely on section 11 of the Act, which requires issuance
of a court order to require production of such detailed information,
unless the parties provided the information on a voluntary basis.
Although an application by the Commissioner for a section 11 order
may be made on an ex parte basis, there at least was a form of prior
judicial check on the scope and reasonableness of the Bureau's
information demand prior to the March 2009 amendments.
In proposing the United States' style "second request" process, a
number of commentators voiced concerns over the significant powers
that would be given to the Bureau. There was relatively little time for
these concerns to be heard. and addressed as the amendments to the Act
were coupled with the federal Budget bill and enacted on a "fast track."
For example, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) emphasized the need
for "adequate judicial oversight of any administrative power to delay
closings or to compel document and oral productions," 79 and cautioned
that "it is not necessary to provide the Bureau with unfettered discretion
to issue production orders, and to dramatically alter a system that has
worked well for over two decades ... "80
In addition, the CBA advocated a more active role for the Tribunal in
the merger review process. The CBA noted:
While the current law contemplates an active role for the Tribunal in
the merger review process preceding any section 92 application, the
Tribunal's role in that process has been marginal, at most. Since
1985, only two section 100 applications have been brought to the
Tribunal, and no contested section 104 applications have been brought
in merger cases. Hence the resources of the Tribunal are
underutilized, and it is not performing its intended role under the
Act.81
Since the new merger review process has been in force, the Bureau
(to its credit) has issued draft Merger Review Process Guidelines for
consultation. These guidelines attempt to address many of the issues
raised by the adoption of the new merger review process. However,
submissions by the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law
and Section of International Law (collectively, "ABA"), and the CBA
point out that the draft guidelines could benefit from the addition of
certain procedural protections. For example, the ABA submitted the
79. Letter from John D. Bodrug, on behalf of the Nat'l Competition Law Section of the
Canadian Bar Ass'n, to Ron Parker, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Industry Canada 4 (Feb. 3,
2009), available at http://www.cba.org/CBA/submissions/pdf/09-04-eng.pdf (regarding
"Potential Amendments to the Competition Act Merger Review Process").
80. Id. at 9.
81. Id.
[Vol. 41
2010] The Institutional Design of Canadian Competition Law 557
following with respect to section 3.8(a) of the draft guidelines which
proposes that any party that objects to the scope of the SIR may, after
discussing the matter with the responsible Assistant Deputy
Commissioner, submit a request to the Senior Deputy Commissioner of
the Mergers Branch to have the SIR reviewed through the Bureau's
internal appeal process:
This process is similar to the appeals process defined in the United
States, where merging parties may pursue an internal appeals process
in which senior officials of the Agencies review and decide parties'
objections to the scope of Second Requests.
Based on the experience of its members, the Sections invite the
Bureau to consider designating a third party-such as a retired
Competition Tribunal member or practitioner acceptable to the
Bureau-to rule on any appeals concerning the scope of
Supplementary Information Requests. The Sections believe that the
internal appeals process followed in the United States has not been
successful. As noted in the Antitrust Section's 2005 submission to the
AMC, private practitioners have expressed concerns regarding 1) the
lack of transparency of the internal appeals process, 2) the failure of
the process to produce any precedents resulting from such decisions,
and 3) the impartiality of the process ....
The Sections recommend that, as with scope disputes, the proposed
review process set out in the Draft Guidelines be placed in the hands
of a retired Tribunal member or practitioner acceptable to the Bureau,
rather than a Bureau Deputy Commissioner. 82
The CBA expressed similar reservations about the fairness of a
process in which an internal Bureau panel reviews decisions made by
Bureau staff which then have a significant impact on Canadian
businesses:
In the absence of a mechanism for the judicial review of SIRs, some
sort of review is necessary to ensure procedural fairness. However,
the internal review mechanism set out in the Guidelines, in which
other Bureau staff is responsible for carrying out the review, although
better than nothing, is unlikely to be accepted as impartial and
effective. A review process could be improved if the reviewer were
neutral. Involving a lawyer from outside practice, or a former judge,
82. RESPONSES TO THE CONSULTATION ON THE DRAFT ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES ON THE
REVISED MERGER REvIEw PROCESS, JOINT COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW AND SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE COMPETITION
BUREAU (CANADA) DRAFT ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES ON THE REVISED MERGER REVIEW
PROCESS § II(H), (J) (May 2009), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/03106.html.
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for instance, would be an improvement over the procedure in the draft
Guidelines. 83
The Canadian Chamber of Commerce concurred:
The Canadian Chamber agrees with the concept of some sort of
oversight of the conduct of the supplemental information request
internal review and approval process (section 3.4). However, the
process contemplated by the Draft Bulletin raises some issues, as it
arguably does not constitute a meaningful neutral review. It is
unclear, for example, why a neutral review process would include two
individuals with carriage of the file. The Canadian Chamber urges the
Bureau to consider instead a review process under which a third party
arbiter be engaged to resolve all disputes that may arise in the context
of compliance with a supplementary information request. 84
The above organizations were not the only ones who have suggested
use of an experienced third party, rather than an internal review, to
decide issues related to the scope of the SIR as well as compliance with
it. The writers of this paper have also suggested this, as have other
counsel, in the course of the Bureau's 2009 consultative process.
2. Abuse of Dominance
Canada's abuse of dominance laws also were amended in March
2009; these provisions now allow the Tribunal to impose Administrative
Monetary Penalties (AMPs) of up to ten million dollars (up to fifteen
million dollars for repeat offenders) for contraventions of the abuse of
dominance provisions in addition to the typical remedy available for
abuse of dominance in Canada, which is a prohibition on the abusive
conduct on a going-forward basis. While the increased penalties are
designed to deter anticompetitive conduct by companies that occupy a
dominant presence in the marketplace, concerns have been expressed
that they may have a chilling effect on vigorous competition, and may
potentially raise constitutional issues given that significant penal
83. NAT'L COMPETITION LAW SECTION OF THE CANADIAN BAR Assoc., DRAFT
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES: REVISED MERGER REVIEW PROCESS 9 (June 2009), available at
http://www.cb-bc.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Canadian%20Bar/20Association-
Merger%20Review/o20Process-comments.pdf/$FILE/Canadian%2OBar/o20Association-
Merger0/o20Review 0/20Process-comnents.pdf.
84. RESPONSES TO THE CONSULTATION ON THE DRAFT ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES ON THE
REVISED MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, CANADIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE SUBMISSION ON THE
DRAFT MERGER REVIEW GUIDELINES § F (May 26, 2009), available at
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03107.html.
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consequences are possible for contravention of a civil provision of the
Act.85
Given that the Bureau has a monopoly on enforcement of the abuse
of dominance provisions, only the Commissioner can decide whether or
not a company will be potentially subject to AMPs by exercising her
discretion to bring an application to the Tribunal. Moreover, under
section 105(2) of the Act, it seems conceivable that a consent agreement
negotiated by the Bureau and the target of an abuse of dominance
investigation could include the imposition of AMPs of up to ten million
dollars (or fifteen million dollars in some cases). This means that the
prospect of AMPs could be used as negotiating leverage by the Bureau.
This would significantly enhance the Commissioner's importance
with respect to enforcement, including the manner in which abuse of
dominance cases may be settled by negotiated resolution. Once again,
because of the consent order amendments passed in 2002, as discussed
above, the Commissioner is in a stronger position in relation to
proposed consent orders than she was in prior cases. Parties may now
have to address not only the terms of a remedial order but also a
monetary penalty to reach a proposed consent order in certain types of
abuse of dominance cases.
3. Criminal Conspiracy Provisions
The recent amendments also fundamentally change provisions
dealing with agreements between competitors. Under the existing
statutory provisions, agreements that unduly lessen competition or
unreasonably enhance the price of a product are potentially subject to
criminal sanctions. Under the amended statutory provisions, which
come into force after March 12, 2010, there will be two enforcement
tracks for agreements between competitors: one for hard core cartels
and one for other agreements among competitors.
Hard core cartels and other specific activities (e.g., fixing prices or
supply, allocating markets or customers) will be subject to serious
criminal sanctions and possible private actions for damages. The new
criminal standards will make it per se illegal for competitors (or persons
who would be likely to compete) to enter into an agreement or
85. A penalty that amounts to a "true penal consequence" attracts the constitutional
protections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R 541
(Can.). In particular, the penalty may be unconstitutional unless the criminal standard of proof is
used, full disclosure is provided, and the vagueness of the statute is eliminated by proscribing
practices prospectively rather than simply prohibiting them after review. See Standing Comm. on
Ind., Natural Res., Sci. and Tech., 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2005 (Oct. 25, 2005) (testimony of Prof.
Peter Hogg).
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arrangement to fix prices, allocate sales, territories, customers and
markets, or fix production or supply.86 Breach of these per se rules
could lead to a prison term of up to fourteen years or a fine of up to
C$25 million. A violation could also expose parties to civil liability for
damages. There is, however, a defense available under the new law
which places the burden on the defendants to prove, on the balance of
probabilities, that: (1) the agreement in question is ancillary to a broader
or separate principal agreement that includes the same parties; and (2)
the agreement is "reasonably necessary" for implementing the principal
agreement. 87
Other agreements or arrangements between competitors that lessen or
prevent competition substantially are subject to civil investigation by
the Bureau and potential remedial action by the Tribunal, although no
fines or private damages can be awarded.
As with the amendments to the merger review process, this change
has sparked more concerns about the enhanced discretionary powers
handed to the Bureau and its Commissioner. Under the new framework,
the Commissioner will decide whether the evaluation of an agreement
or arrangement between competitors will proceed on a criminal or a
civil track, and the Commissioner will decide when to announce the
track selected. While the Bureau has attempted to alleviate many of
these concerns through the issuance of Draft Enforcement Guidelines on
Competitor Collaborations, some concerns still remain. As the CBA
points out: "A delayed election to proceed on a civil track could create
the perception that the Bureau is leveraging civil outcomes against
criminal risk, particularly where possible resolution discussions take
place prior to a determination of whether the matter would proceed as a
civil or criminal matter."88  Similar concerns have existed in recent
years in relation to the dual tracks available for misleading advertising
matters; the Bureau and the Commissioner are already sensitized to
these issues. The recent amendments extend the potential magnitude of
such issues.
D. Proliferation ofAgency Enforcement Guidelines
One of the byproducts of the limited scope of private actions under
the Act, and the desire for parties (particularly in mergers) to seek
86. The Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 45(1) (1985).
87. Id. §45(7).
88. NAT'L COMPETITION LAW SECTION OF THE CANADIAN BAR Ass'N, DRAFT
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES ON COMPETITOR COLLABORATION 6 (Aug. 2009) available at
http://www.cb-bc.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/09-47-e.pdf/$FILE/09-47-e.pdf.
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negotiated rather than contested remedies, is the significant shortage of
decided cases. While the Competition Act has been in force for over
twenty years, there is relatively little jurisprudence on how its
provisions are to be interpreted, particularly in the areas of mergers and
abuse of dominance. As a result, businesses and their counsel have had
precious few decisions to draw upon for guidance.89
The Bureau appears to be doing its best to fill this void by issuing
enforcement guidelines (typically with input obtained from consultation
with the legal and business communities), as well as publishing
speeches, press releases, backgrounders on investigations, annual
reports, studies, and other resource publications. 90 For example in the
mergers area alone, the Bureau has released the following guidance: 91
* very detailed Merger Enforcement Guidelines; 92
* an Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada;
93
* draft Merger Enforcement Guidelines as Applied to a Bank
Merger;
* draft Enforcement Guidelines on the Merger Review Process;
and
* a Bulletin on Efficiencies in Merger Review.
In the area of abuse of dominance, the Bureau has published:
" draft Updated Enforcement Guidelines on the Abuse of
Dominance Provisions;
" guidelines concerning the Abuse of Dominance Provisions as
Applied to the Retail Grocery Industry; and
* an Information Bulletin on the Abuse of Dominance
Provisions as Applied to the Telecommunications Industry.
Enforcement guidelines and other informal guidance from the Bureau
contribute greatly to the business community's interest in achieving
transparency, accountability, and relative certainty of process without
89. Quinn et al., supra note 45, at 5.
90. In fact, Canada was one of the first countries to begin issuing public news releases in cases
where there was "no challenge" explaining the reasons for the decision. Calvin S. Goldman,
Navin Joneja & Prakash Narayanan, Merger Enforcement Guidelines: Lessons from the Canadian
Experience, India's New Merger Notification Regime Benefits of and Scope for Merger
Enforcement Guidelines 11-12 (Mar. 16-18, 2008).
91. A complete list of the Bureau's enforcement guidelines and bulletins is available online.
Competition Bureau, Publications, http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/h_00139.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
92. Canadian Competition Bureau, Merger Enforcement Guidelines, http://www.cb-
bc.gc.caleic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/0 I 245.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
93. Canadian Competition Bureau, Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada,
http://competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02170.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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imposition of unnecessary cost and delay. For instance, among the key
benefits that merger guidelines provide are: greater predictability to
facilitate business planning, and explanation of resolution tools to help
both predictability and avoidance of unnecessary litigation. The
publication of enforcement guidelines also enhances the ability of
competition law authorities to coordinate and cooperate in multinational
transactions and provides significant benefits for international
businesses that must navigate the merger review processes in various
jurisdictions for any given transaction. By way of illustration, the
Bureau's "Merger Remedies Bulletin fulfills this role with an entire
chapter devoted to International Coordination and Cooperation." 94
While the Bureau's informal guidance is certainly helpful, from an
institutional perspective, an over-reliance on administrative enforcement
guidelines has its own potential drawbacks. For example, there may be
a strong disincentive for the Bureau to take hard positions on complex
issues with uncertain outcomes or outcomes that can go differently
depending on certain variables. This means there may prove to be a
number of important issues that need clarification that is not available
from the Bureau either because the Bureau is reluctant to provide it or
because the Bureau cannot anticipate every possible practical scenario
when drafting guidelines.
In addition, the enforcement guidelines usually do not address the
"hard" cases (i.e., cases where the outcome is in no way certain before
courts apply their minds to it and determine the legal approach to take).
This is important in the competition law context because the primary
rationale for competition law is to permit businesses to compete as
aggressively as they can without crossing the line into anticompetitive
behavior. If there is uncertainty about competition law, the "chilling
effect" on businesses may be damaging to Canada's economic growth
and the competitiveness of particular markets.
In addition, because both markets and the legal process are dynamic
and constantly evolving, the Bureau and its Commissioner need to be
careful not to become too embedded in their own guidelines. This is
discussed in more detail below.
E. Finding the Right Balance-Ensuring Fairness of Process
The role of the Commissioner supported by the Bureau has grown in
importance since the establishment of the current institutional
framework in Canada in 1986. In the area of negotiated resolutions, the
94. Goldman et al., supra note 90, at 13.
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Commissioner's role has effectively expanded to include in a de facto
manner, quasi-adjudicative functions, whereas the role of the Tribunal
has been significantly diminished as a result of the 2002 amendments.95
This is particularly so in regard to the resolution of merger cases, for the
reasons discussed earlier in this paper.96 Similarly, due in large part to a
lack of Tribunal case law, the heavy reliance on Bureau enforcement
guidelines runs the risk that such publications may be treated in a quasi-
legislative and binding manner. Guidelines require a certain trade-off.
On the one hand, they are designed to and do actually provide benefits
in terms of enhancing planning, transparency, agency accountability,
and business certainty. On the other hand, some of the checks and
balances inherent to an impartial review by an independent adjudicative
body may be sacrificed if the Bureau and its Commissioner do not
sufficiently account for individual case specifics and novel relevant
points. Enforcement discretion must be preserved, and this is especially
so when such enforcement moves to a de facto adjudicative power. In
the latter cases, such as when the Commissioner is resolving a proposed
consent order in a merger case, discretion must be preserved to ensure
each case is decided on its own merits.
This paper does not propose major structural changes to the
institutional design of the Canadian framework. We are not proposing,
for example, that the 2002 amendments to the consent agreement
process be changed having regard to the relative activism of the
Tribunal seen in the pre-2002 period. In real world terms, there is no
turning back the clock; the Tribunal's lack of sufficient workload since
its inception means there is a real risk it will become overly active in
relation to a proposed consent order, and many of us do not want that to
re-occur. Regrettably, the Tribunal has not, since its inception in 1986,
had enough of a caseload to fully occupy the time of its members; this
may explain in part why Tribunal members tend to find particular cases
exceptionally interesting and probe them more actively than, for
instance, an over-worked trial judge. Finding the right model for the
Tribunal (e.g., part-time judges, full-time lay members) is a topic that
95. While there have been cases that looked at specific aspects of the consent order process
since the 2002 amendments, and there were earlier cases which examined the role and duties of
the Commissioner as an enforcement official, no cases since 2002 have focused on the degree to
which the 2002 amendments and other factors discussed in this paper may be imposing new
process responsibilities on the Commissioner.
96. The Commissioner's direct influence over the terms of a proposed order is not only
derived from the consent order process under section 105 of the Act for merger and abuse of
dominance cases, but arises in a parallel manner for consent orders in deceptive marketing cases
under subsection 74.12 of the Act. The Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 74(12) (1985).
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may be worthy of further study as we have now had some twenty years
experience with the current framework; however, that question is
beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, experience shows that most
stakeholders want the Commissioner to effectively and fairly resolve
issues in an expeditious and more time-certain manner, particularly in
merger cases.
This paper does not advocate specific structural reforms, but it does
propose a careful in-depth consideration of additional safeguards that
may be needed as a consequence of the increasingly dominant role
played by the Commissioner and the Bureau. A different model worthy
of consideration is the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which is
comprised of five presidentially-appointed commissioners, one of
whom acts as the Chairperson. 97
One salient feature of the FTC scheme is its procedural safeguards
that restrict the degree of contact and discussion agency officials
conducting an investigation have with the agency commissioners.
There are no doubt other procedural safeguards applicable to cases
before the FTC. We are not experts in FTC process, but we assume
such rules and safeguards are in place to protect the integrity of, and
respect for, the FTC's decision-making authority. Another integrated
enforcement agency that adopts a model similar to the FTC is the
Ontario Securities Commission. It also has operating restrictions on the
degree of contact between its enforcement staff and the Commissioners
97. The FTC may commence an inquiry based upon letters from consumers or businesses,
congressional inquiries, or articles on consumer or economic subjects, at the Attorney General's
request, or as a result of a mandatory filing in the case of proposed mergers. The FTC's
investigative authority includes the power to subpoena documents and/or individuals and to
require the filing of annual or special reports.
If the FTC determines that a violation has occurred, it may issue a complaint setting forth its
allegations and offer the respondent an opportunity to settle the charges before any enforcement
proceedings are commenced. If the respondent elects to settle the charges, a consent agreement
will be executed which, if accepted and approved after sixty days of public comment, results in a
final order. If the respondent elects instead to contest the charges, the FTC may issue a complaint
and have the matter adjudicated before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in a trial-type
proceeding. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act also empowers the FTC to obtain preliminary (or
permanent) injunctive relief from a federal court for violations of any provision of law that the
FTC enforces; the FTC has used section 13(b) primarily for the purpose of obtaining preliminary
injunctive relief against mergers pending completion of an FTC administrative hearing. The FTC
may commence an administrative proceeding for a trial on the merits whether or not injunctive
relief is granted by the federal court. At the conclusion of the administrative proceeding, the ALI
issues an initial decision setting forth his or her findings of fact and conclusions of law and a
recommendation for an order to cease and desist or dismissal of the case. The AL's initial
decision may be appealed to the full Commission, which in turn conducts a hearing and issues a
final decision. The Commission's final decision may be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court.
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with responsibility for adjudication in connection with any given
investigation. The Commission also enjoys the advantage of dedicated
funding arrangements financed through levies on industry participants.
In two papers published in 2002, one of the authors proposed the
adoption of an institutional structure for the Bureau that is in many
respects similar to that of the United States' FTC.98 Those papers
outline a proposal to create a panel of three commissioners who would
constitute the "Competition Commission" rather than having all
decisions be the responsibility of a single Commissioner. This panel,
consisting of one Chair and two Commissioners, would make all
decisions to initiate inquiries, grant clearances to modify or challenge a
merger, or initiate consent order proceedings by a majority vote.
At the same time, because we are assuming that further amendments
to the Competition Act and the Competition Tribunal Act are not
forthcoming in the near term, we think that formulating additional
checks and balances within the Bureau's operating mandate can
constitute a more realistic, practical and expeditious set of steps that can
be taken to ensure a sense of due process in determining remedies,
particularly in merger cases. The challenge, then, is to find the right
balance. Below, we offer a few suggestions for further discussion about
this topic.
First, as a guiding principle, it is well established under Canadian
administrative law that:
The more the process provided for, the function of the tribunal, the
nature of the decision-making body, and the determinations that must
be made to reach a decision resemble judicial decision making, the
more likely it is that procedural protections closer to the trial model
will be required by the duty of fairness. 99
In other words, as the Commissioner becomes not only the statutory
officer responsible for the investigation but starts to take on
responsibilities akin to quasi-adjudicative functions, there is rising
demand and a strong argument for more fulsome procedural fairness
98. Goldman et al., supra note 24; C. Goldman, R. Kwinter & K. Lawal, Institutional Design
Issues-Competition Bureau and Competition Tribunal: Synopsis of Recent Perspectives and
Issues Going Forward (May 8-10, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the the Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal).
99. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 23
(Can.), citing Old St. Boniface Residents Ass'n Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170;
Syndicat des employ6s de production du Qu6bec & de l'Acadie v. Canada (Human Rights
Comm'n), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879 (Can.); see also Knight v. Indian Head Sch. Div. No. 19, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 653 (Can.) ("[B]oth the duty to act fairly and the duty to act judicially have their roots in
the same general principles of natural justice.").
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rights before a final decision is made; this is particularly so in merger
cases.
We have already outlined the practical realities in merger cases that
lead most merging parties toward trying to resolve issues on a
comparatively expeditious and certain basis so that the merger can go
forward to the extent so resolved. This context gives the Commissioner
significantly more bargaining leverage than most other types of cases.
That authority should be exercised in a properly informed, careful, and
procedurally fair manner, particularly given the fact that since 2002 the
Tribunal has been lacking any effective oversight before the consent
agreement becomes a consent order. Some of the terms of such orders
are extensive, both in the number of commitments and requirements to
which parties consent. Some of the terms also extend over many years.
Moreover, breach of the terms of such orders may give rise to either
contempt proceedings before the Tribunal or a prosecution.
Prosecutions may be brought against not only the corporation, but in
some circumstances, also against any directors or officers who
authorized or acquiesced in the alleged breach. 100 Thus, such consent
agreements have potentially serious and enforceable obligations and
penalties if breached. All of these considerations reinforce the changing
role of the Commissioner when resolving a merger case by way of a
consent agreement. These could include more broadly: the right for
parties to be heard directly by the Commissioner (supported by her own
advisors), particularly at the assessment and decision-making stages of a
case; the right to continuous consultations with Bureau senior officials
prior to being heard directly by the Commissioner; and other process
fairness protections.
With respect to specific aspects of merger remedy negotiations in
particular, given the diminished role of the Tribunal in consent
agreement oversight, resolution discussions between the Commissioner
and the affected parties should look toward some sense of process
fairness and flexibility. In this connection, the Commissioner may
consider procedural mechanisms to ensure that the Commissioner is
somewhat independent from the Bureau's investigation. For example,
the conduct of the merger review and critical assessment can almost be
entirely delegated to the Senior Deputy Commissioner in the Mergers
Branch. Pursuant to section 8 of the Act, such delegation does not
impede the Commissioner's powers or duties under the Act. In this
manner, the Commissioner should maintain a willingness to keep an
open mind until she hears from not only her Deputy and officials, but
100. The Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 65(4) (1985).
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also the parties directly (in writing and verbally) or even third-parties,
thereby giving the Commissioner a level of impartiality. The
Commissioner also may retain her own counsel and advisers to assist
her decision-making functions; these individuals would not be involved
in the Mergers Branch investigations, but would be available to assist
the Commissioner with her decisions. This is again more critical at the
assessment and decision-making stages of a case. We are not
suggesting that Bureau officials and their counsel do not do their best to
try to present the facts to the Commissioner fairly in summarizing the
parties' positions, but the fact is that parties and their counsel will
normally present arguments in their own style, with their own emphasis.
Furthermore, parties and their counsel would likely be more effective in
explaining certain aspects of the businesses and industry at issue, of
which Bureau staff may not be fully cognizant. In any event, the ability
for parties to meet with the Commissioner directly at least contributes to
the appearance of fairness. Whatever the Commissioner decides, it
should be explained to the parties directly affected with sufficient
reasons. 101
Next, with respect to the use of agency enforcement guidelines, two
key principles ought to be kept in mind based on the experience in
Canada. First, the issuance of agency enforcement guidelines cannot
fetter the Commissioner's discretion to apply the law on a case-by-case
basis. Fundamental principles of administrative law provide that the
Commissioner must not fetter her statutorily-conferred discretion by
mechanically applying enforcement guidelines that the Bureau
previously formulated (unless legislation explicitly authorizes it to do
so, i.e., through a statutory power to make subordinate legislation
whereupon the guidelines are of a regulatory nature). For example,
leading administrative law scholars in Canada have remarked that:
An agency may not fetter the exercise of its statutory discretion, or its
duty to interpret and apply the provisions of its enabling statute, by
mechanically applying a rule that it had previously formulated, other
than where it is properly enacted pursuant to a statutory power to
make subordinate legislation. 10 2
101. while earlier cases have determined that, as a statutory enforcement official, the courts
will not substitute their discretion for that of the Commissioner in relation to enforcement matters
(leaving aside statutory duties required by the legislation), those cases did not consider the effect
of the 2002 amendments and the other factors noted in this paper relating to the evolving role of
the Commissioner.
102. 3 D.J.M. BROWN & J.M. EVANS, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN
CANADA § 12:4410 (Canvasback Publishing 2004).
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It is not in itself unlawful for the Bureau to take informal rules,
policies or guidelines, or previous precedents into account in exercising
its discretion or interpreting and applying the provisions of its enabling
statute. However, the Bureau risks acting unlawfully if it is not
prepared to entertain and consider submissions that are designed to
show not only that-properly interpreted-a rule, policy, guideline, or
precedent does not cover the facts of a particular case, but also that even
if it does, an exception should be made in light of the facts of the
particular case. 10 3  Blind adherence to a policy, rule, guideline, or
precedent is improper even when it reflects-and attempts to balance-
a number of different policy considerations. 10 4 In practice, this means
that the Commissioner and her staff need to be cognizant of the fact that
enforcement guidelines do not, in and of themselves, serve as binding
law. Rather, they should be interpreted in a flexible manner to adapt to
the facts of a particular case.
We are not suggesting that the Commissioner has used Bureau
guidelines in an overly binding or improper manner; however, as the
Commissioner's decision-making function becomes more quasi-
judicial, particularly in relation to proposed consent orders in merger
cases, we can anticipate greater attention focused on the manner in
which the Commissioner reaches her conclusions. Thus, a caution in
this area is intended to be a constructive suggestion.
Second, as a corollary, an important point to note from the Canadian
experience is that any guidelines developed by the Bureau need to
remain consistent with the governing legislation, regulations, and case
103. See, e.g., Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, 6-7 (Can.) (describing
the discretion available to the Minister); Ha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration),
[2004] 3 F.C. 195 (Can.) (noting that "While administrative decision-makers may validly adopt
guidelines to assist them in exercising their discretion, they are not free to adopt mandatory
policies that leave no room for the exercise of discretion."); Glaxo Wellcome PLC v. Canada
(Minister of Nat'l Revenue), [1998] 162 D.L.R. 433 (Can.); Carpenter Fishing Corp. v. Canada
(Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), [1997] 155 D.L.R. 572, 581 (Can.) (discussing the "long-
settled principle governing the exercise of discretion" that "the donee of a power must 'act
fairly'); see also Capital Cities Commc'ns Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Comm'n, [ 1978] 2
S.C.R. 141, 169-71 (Can.) (discussing "whether the Commission or its Executive Committee
acting under its licensing authority, is entitled to exercise that authority by reference to policy
statements or whether it is limited in the way it deals with licence applications or with
applications to amend licenses to conformity with regulations"); British Oxygen Co. v. Bd. of
Trade, [1971] A.C. 610, 625 (Can.); Re Hopedale Devs. Ltd. & Town of Oakville, (1965 1 O.R.
259, 263 (Can.); Halfway River First Nation v. B.C. (Ministry of Forests), [1999J 64 B.C.L.R.
206, 230 (Can.) (discussing qualifications to decide legal issues arising under the respective
treaty); Pezim v. B.C. (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557, 596 (Can.).
104. See, e.g., Heisler v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Env't & Res. Mgmt.), [1999] 16 Admin.
L.R. 215, 35-36 (Can.) (reasoning that it would have been improper for the Minister to blindly
apply the policy at issue).
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law. Competition authorities should be careful not to adopt guidelines
that are in any way inconsistent with the legislation or indicate that its
approach is inconsistent with the legislation. However often the
guidelines adopted by the competition authority may be used by
merging entities, and, if those guidelines are not consistent with the
overriding legislation, courts will always look to the legislation and not
the guidelines in determining the appropriate interpretation.
Finally, for purposes of this paper we suggest that the Commissioner
give serious consideration to enhancing the perception of fairness in
relation to those areas of new powers enacted with the March 2009
amendments. First, by indicating that issues pertaining to the scope of a
supplementary information request, or compliance with such, will not
be decided in-house by the Bureau but rather will go to an experienced
third-party arbiter as many have suggested. Second, by clearly
articulating, to the extent possible, what criteria will determine whether
an administrative monetary penalty will be sought in an abuse of
dominance case (whether in addition to or along the lines of the
statutory criteria set out in section 79(3.2)) and what criteria will govern
whether a restrictive agreement is to be investigated under the non-
criminal provisions of the Act (beyond the views contained in the Draft
Guidelines on Competitor Collaborations). Taking all or at least some
of these constructive steps will enhance the appearance of fairness in the
administration and enforcement of the Act; enhanced respect for the
Commissioner's mandate and responsibilities will likely follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Canada's modern competition law framework was established in
1986, less than twenty-five years ago. Since that time, the roles of the
key statutory authorities, namely, the Commissioner and the Tribunal,
have evolved considerably such that the Commissioner's role and
mandate has increased significantly in importance. Steps can and
should be taken, within the bounds of the applicable statutes and case
law, to see that the appropriate checks and balances are in place in order
to ensure that process fairness is maintained while the Commissioner's
objectives in enforcing the competition law are fulfilled effectively and
on an efficient and timely basis.
However, none of us-including the authors of this paper-should be
presumptuous in readily delineating a definitive and unqualified answer
to the fundamental question of what is the right balance. Rather,
attaining the right balance is a process that requires continuous
evaluation of case experience and consultative input, both in relation to
structural and procedural safeguards. Comparative law and experience
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in other jurisdictions is an important consideration in meeting this
objective as the issues and relevant factors are often quite similar. We
are optimistic that the new Commissioner will be oriented toward
consultations with stakeholders and policymakers in an ongoing effort
to ensure that the enforcement of Canada's competition laws evolves in
an effective, timely, and fair manner.
On a more specific going forward basis, we believe that an intensive
study of the decision-making process of entities like the FTC and the
OSC would be a desirable initiative. In order to allow input from
stakeholders, such a study could be undertaken by the Canadian Bar
Association and the Bureau in consultation with participants from the
business community, the Bar, and academic experts. We would suggest
that legal scholars who have already given these matters significant
thought, such as Professors Trebilcock and Iacobucci from the
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, and other panellists in this
symposium, be invited to participate in this consultative process.
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APPENDIX A
CANADIAN COMPETITION ACT: KEY CIVIL PROVISIONS
Abuse of Dominance. In Canada, possessing a dominant position is not in itself
illegal. Abuse of a dominant position by resorting to anti-competitive acts in a
market can, however, give rise to an order by the Tribunal if such abuse results in a
substantial lessening or prevention of competition. In order for the Tribunal to
issue an order in respect of abuse of dominance there are essentially three
conditions that must be met: (1) substantial or complete control of a class of
business in Canada by a firm or firms; (2) a practice of "anti-competitive acts"; and
(3) the practice must have the effect of preventing or lessening competition
substantially in a market. Pursuant to recent amendments to the abuse of
dominance provisions of the Act, conduct that contravenes these provisions can
lead to administrative monetary penalties of up to $10 million ($15 million for
repeat contraventions).
Price Maintenance. A person engages in price maintenance when, "by
agreement, threat, promise or any like means," he influences upward or
discourages the reduction of the price at which his customer-or any other person
to whom the product comes for resale supplies-offers to supply, or advertises a
product within Canada. A refusal to supply a product to, or otherwise discriminate
against, any person engaged in business in Canada because of that person's low
pricing policy may also amount to a form of price maintenance. The Tribunal may
make an order prohibiting a person from continuing to engage in price
maintenance or requiring the person to accept another person as a customer if the
Tribunal determines that the relevant conduct has had, is having, or is likely to
have an adverse effect on competition.
Exclusive Dealing. Exclusive dealing is the practice of requiring or inducing a
customer to deal only or primarily in products of the supplier by means of more
favourable terms or conditions. Exclusive dealing arrangements are subject to
review if. (1) the supplier is a major supplier of the product; (2) the practice
impedes entry or expansion of a firm or product in a market or has some other
exclusionary effect in the market; and (3) the practice is likely to substantially
lessen competition. If the practice is carried on for a reasonable time only in order
to facilitate entry of a new supplier or a new product into the market, the Tribunal
will not prohibit the practice.
Tied Selling. Tied selling is the practice of requiring or inducing a customer to
buy a product as a condition of supplying the customer with another product. The
Tribunal will not prohibit this practice unless the conditions referred to above
relating to exclusive dealing are met. However, even if such conditions are met,
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no order will issue if the Tribunal finds that the practice is reasonable, having
regard to the technological relationship between the products.
Market Restriction. Market restriction is the practice of requiring a customer to
sell a product only in a defined market as a condition of supplying that product.
Again, if the practice is engaged in by a major supplier and is likely to
substantially lessen competition, the Tribunal can put an end to the practice. It will
not, however, make an order if the practice is engaged in for a reasonable period of
time only to facilitate entry of a new supplier or a new product into a market.
Refusal to Supply. If the Tribunal finds that there is a refusal to supply and
that: (1) the would-be purchaser is substantially affected in its business by the
refusal; (2) such person is unable to obtain adequate supplies because of
insufficient competition among suppliers (e.g., the refusing supplier has a
monopoly or a very strong market position); (3) such person is willing and able to
meet the usual trade terms of the supplier; (4) the product is in ample supply; and
(5) competition is adversely affected, the Tribunal may order the supply of the
product on usual trade terms.
